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Introduction 
 
 
Syria’s Uneasy Bedfellows 
Perpetuation of Conflict Serves Radicals, Prospect for Compromise Increases Moderation 
Khaled Yacoub Oweis and Heiko Wimmen 
The siege of Aleppo and the mounting losses of opposition districts throws a central 
dilemma for the Syrian rebels into sharp relief: if they hope to hold out against the 
Assad regime and its Russian and Iranian backers, they cannot forego the support 
of extremist Jihadi groups. Yet it is the prominent role of these same extremists that 
provides the justification for the Russian intervention and the excuse for Western 
powers to withhold support for the rebellion. Events in recent months have shown that 
the prospect of starting a political process furthers the position of moderate and non-
Jihadi Islamists and helps isolate the extremists. Germany and its European allies should 
insist on committing Russia to the diplomatic process and encourage supporters of the 
Syrian opposition to work towards consolidating actors compatible with a potential 
transition process. 
 
In mid-August 2016, the al-Qaeda offshoot 
Jabhat Fath al-Sham (Front for the Conquest 
of the Levant, JFS) claimed most of the credit 
for the rebel offensive south of Aleppo that 
temporarily broke the Assad regime’s siege 
of the city. Arab media aligned with Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf states, particularly the 
Qatari channel al-Jazeera, hailed the short-
lived success of the group formerly known 
as Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Nusra Front, JN). Even 
moderate opposition groups and Islamists 
with little sympathy for the Jihadi ideology 
of JN/JFS had to acknowledge its value as a 
military ally. 
This underlines a central dilemma for 
the Syrian opposition and its external sup-
porters: while there is little love for the 
Jihadists, their military power makes them 
indispensable in the fight against the Assad 
regime. But their internal cohesion has 
been shaky and the relationship with other 
rebel brigades has been marked by distrust. 
On the local level, support for JN among the 
Sunni population in rebel areas has been 
tempered by discontent with the group’s 
rule and a drive by a new generation of 
moderate – but still anti-Assad – clerics to 
counter the group’s propaganda on social 
media. The Sunni population have already 
endured indiscriminate Russian bombing 
justified as “eradicating terrorism” but 
mostly targeting less hardline groups with 
local roots standing as a bulwark against 
a total takeover of JN in rebel-held Syria. 
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Hardline Allies Riddled with 
Contradictions 
In early 2015, Turkish and Saudi mediation 
had already helped engineer a loose alliance 
of Islamist groups under the name “Army 
of Conquest” (Jaish al-Fath). Beside JN, the 
second mainstay of the alliance was Ahrar 
al-Sham, a Salafist group strongly connected 
to Turkish intelligence. Ahrar al-Sham is 
comprised of a patchwork of local brigades 
with a significant degree of autonomy and 
a less rigid hierarchy than JN/JFS. The group 
has been plagued by internal struggles 
between commanders who lean towards 
the transnational Jihadism of al-Qaeda and 
others who prioritize the national struggle 
against Assad and want to keep lines of 
communication open with Western powers. 
For example, Labib al-Nahhas, the group’s 
external relations official, cuts a sleek, 
Westernized figure compared to his long-
bearded brother Kinan who is also a mem-
ber of the group’s political leadership tier. 
However, the military commanders, who 
overwhelmingly belong to the more ideo-
logical faction, wield decisive influence 
over the overall orientation of the group. In 
September 2014, a group of leaders around 
co-founder Hassan Abboud, who was alleg-
edly aiming to steer the group away from 
militant Islamism towards a more Syrian-
nationalist posture, were killed in an attack 
on their headquarters in Idlib that some 
blamed on the so-called Islamic State. Pro-
minent Western observers, such as the for-
mer US ambassador to Syria Robert S. Ford, 
have advocated opening channels with 
Ahrar al-Sham, arguing that the group is 
fundamentally different from JN and, de-
spite its Islamist composition, might be 
nudged into accepting a pluralist future 
for Syria. 
Most importantly, however, unlike JN, 
Ahrar al-Sham is not considered a “terror-
ist” organization by external actors and 
international institutions. Hence, bringing 
the two together in early 2015, along with a 
number of smaller groups, allowed Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar to ramp up support 
for a formation that included and benefitted 
from the power of JN without being com-
promised by giving open support to “ter-
rorists”. Such support and coordination 
allowed the joint forces to capture most of 
Idlib province from the regime in May 2015. 
Subsequent advances in the area between 
Hama and Latakia threatened to split the 
regime-held area in two and cut off Assad’s 
seat of power in Damascus from the coast. 
It was at this point that Russia intervened 
in September 2015 and turned the military 
balance once more. 
As the United States and its Western 
allies became ever more preoccupied with 
fighting the Islamic State and “terrorism”, 
the foreign backers of Islamist brigades 
found themselves in a quandary. By Novem-
ber 2015, Turkey and Qatar felt compelled 
to sign up to the Vienna statement as mem-
bers of the International Syria Support 
Group (ISSG) which set defeating the Islamic 
State and the JN as an international goal. 
Thus, salvaging as much as possible of what 
is a major force in the opposition camp 
became a priority. Pressure mounted on the 
more ideological wing of al-Nusra to tone 
down its Jihadist rhetoric and rebrand. 
The Many Faces of JN/JFS 
In late July 2016, JN officially severed its 
ties to al-Qaeda and changed its name. 
Whether this decision reflected a genuine 
change in the group’s ideological orienta-
tion remains doubtful. Leader Abu Moham-
mad al-Golani explained in a message that 
the move was mainly geared to deprive 
external powers such as the US or Russia 
of a pretext for attacks. Qatar, the external 
actor best connected with JN, is said to have 
prompted the group to rebrand itself to 
become more palatable for Western actors 
and ease pressure on countries that support 
it. This rebranding was received positively 
by the Saudi, Qatari and pro-government 
Turkish media. But it did not help soften 
the position of the United States which in-
tensified its drone warfare against JN’s com-
manders after the move. 
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Main Rebel Groups 
Ahrar al-Sham: Rebuilt itself with the 
help of Turkey after its top leadership 
were wiped out in an explosion in 2014. 
Speculation over who perpetrated the 
attack has ranged from foreign powers 
to Jihadist rivals. The group has an esti-
mated 20,000 fighters and, along with 
Jabhat Fath al-Sham (JFS), has a heavy 
presence in Idlib province on the Turk-
ish border and is fighting the regime in 
the Hama and Homs countryside. 
Jabhat Fath al-Sham JFS, formerly 
Jabhat al-Nusra, (JN) has a similar geo-
graphical spread to Ahrar al-Sham with 
an estimated half the number of 
fighters. Many of its commanders retain 
links to the Islamic State although the 
Islamic State expelled the group from 
Eastern Syria in 2014. JFS boasts about 
its independence and self-sufficiency, 
especially after breaking from al-Qaeda 
in 2016. But it has communication 
channels with Qatar whose al-Jazeera 
channel has been sympathetic to the 
group. 
Jaish al-Islam: tied to Saudi Arabia 
through Salafist clerics close to the 
kingdom’s Wahhabi establishment. 
Active mainly in the Eastern Ghouta 
suburbs of Damascus and in the Qala-
moun mountain region between Leba-
non and Syria 
Free Syrian Army (FSA): Led mostly by 
defectors from the Assad military. Over-
all strength estimated at 35,000 active 
fighters in fragmented brigades. Apart 
from southern Syria, FSA brigades are 
active in Aleppo and suburbs on the 
eastern outskirts of Damascus. 
 
However, while there are good reasons to 
doubt the sincerity of the manoeuvre, it is 
still worth noting that JFS is comprised of 
different contingents with varying local 
loyalties and commitment to ideology. This 
implies that those factions who have had 
second thoughts about its close links to 
al-Qaeda, may move closer to the more 
moderate Islamist mainstream. 
These “pragmatist” factions argue in 
favour of winning over local communities 
and building a popular base, rather than 
relying on the imposition of rigid ideologi-
cal prescriptions. They are also utterly hos-
tile to the Islamic State, while commanders 
from the ideological camp are known to 
not shy away from tactical cooperation with 
the Islamic State. Among the most promi-
nent pragmatists is Iraqi Jihadist Abu 
Marya al-Qahtani who was demoted from 
the group’s upper echelon in 2014 and has 
kept a low profile since, but re-emerged 
on social media after the rebranding. Abu 
Marya has often warned of Islamic State 
sleeper cells within JN/JFS and Ahrar 
al-Sham. He vowed to go after Islamic State 
commanders accusing the organization of 
being run by former Saddam henchmen 
who were “doing the bidding of the Assad 
regime”. Another important rift within 
JFS concerns its cooperation with Western-
backed brigades of the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA). Abu Marya and other pragmatists 
oppose JFS’s practice of branding such 
groups as “apostates”, an accusation that 
would appear to rule out even tactical 
cooperation. In the areas under JFS’s con-
trol, the pragmatists, some of whom are 
military commanders with broad discre-
tionary authority, have a reputation for 
being more lenient with the local popula-
tions, and for being willing to cooperate 
with local clerics and leaders and reject 
extreme interpretations of religion. 
Conversely, foreign fighters who consider 
Syria a transient battlefield in a global 
struggle are more likely to adopt extremist 
positions. They also appear to have been the 
most recalcitrant opponents of the rebrand-
ing effort, despite reassurances that the 
central tenets of al-Qaeda’s ideology still 
stand (which partly defeated the purpose 
of the whole manoeuvre). The challenge to 
keep them in line was aptly illustrated by 
the video that announced its disassociation 
from al-Qaeda in which the prominent 
Egyptian commander Abu Faraj al-Masri 
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(since killed in a US drone strike) was seated 
next to JFS’s leader al-Golani despite Masri’s 
known opposition to the step. 
The Politics of Truce 
Despite such efforts, JN/JFS remains un-
popular throughout most rebel areas. 
The rapid setbacks that occurred after the 
offensive in Aleppo drew further scorn. Yet, 
faced with the onslaught of the regime and 
its foreign backers, many still see it as a 
necessary evil. 
Events during the short-lived ceasefire 
in September 2016 indicate that support 
for JN/JFS may indeed quickly evaporate 
once the immediate military threat has 
been withdrawn and a political process 
has begun. The ceasefire agreement struck 
between the US and Russia was supposed to 
lead to close cooperation between the two 
powers, even including a joint operation 
room, in the fight against the Islamic State 
and JN/JFS. As part of this process, Moscow 
and Washington were supposed to agree on 
a delineation of areas where Syrian rebels 
not classified internationally as terrorists 
were to be spared, with Russia expected to 
commit the Syrian regime to compliance 
with these terms. Events on the ground 
during the few days that the truce actually 
held indicate that this approach could have 
worked to isolate JN/JFS and strengthen 
more moderate groups instead. Residents 
of rebel towns were anxious not to retain 
the group in their midst as that would have 
likely exposed them to internationally sanc-
tioned bombings by Russia and the US-led 
coalition. A few months earlier, demonstra-
tions in the rebel town of Maarat al-Numaan 
in Idlib province had already forced the 
Front to scale down its presence there. The 
reason for the popular rage was the death 
of some 50 prisoners, most of which the 
Front was holding for peacefully resisting 
its arbitrary rule, when an airstrike hit a 
court building. The partial pullout of JN 
allowed an FSA (Free Syrian Army) unit 
called Brigade 13 to regain a foothold in 
Maarat al-Numaan. Several rebel groups 
made it clear that allowing JN/JFS to oper-
ate amongst them would amount to opera-
tional suicide. Some voices in the opposi-
tion argued that, given the international 
focus on anti-terrorism, the group should 
find a way to expel commanders seen as 
ideologically inflexible, disband and merge 
into other brigades rather than taking the 
remaining rebels down with it. 
Other political actors also scrambled 
to get on the right side of the Moscow-
Washington deal. For instance, on 11 Sep-
tember 2016 the Syrian Muslim Brother-
hood issued a declaration that renounced 
‘terrorism’ and emphasized that the Syrian 
revolt only militarized in self-defence 
against the regime’s crackdown on the 
peaceful protest movement. The intention 
appeared to be to protect brigades close 
to the Brotherhood such as Failaq al-Sham 
which had cooperated with FN/JFS in the 
Army of Conquest. 
Another public statement, signed sepa-
rately by FSA brigades and Ahrar al-Sham, 
came close to endorsing the ceasefire while 
objecting to the targeting of JN/JFS as long 
as Shi’ite pro-Assad militias were left un-
scathed. For its part, the National Coalition 
of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces 
(Etilaf) in Istanbul, which represents the 
mainstream opposition, said that the FSA 
would deal ‘positively’ with the ceasefire. 
While the Etilaf exerts little formal control 
over the FSA, let alone more hard-line 
Islamist groups, it remains an important 
conduit to the rebel brigades and wields 
influence by virtue of personal and kinship 
ties between its members and rebel com-
manders on the ground. 
Thriving in War 
The swift collapse of the September cease-
fire, however, threw JN/JFS a lifeline. Dis-
putes with other rebels, local discontent 
and tension in the relationship with Turkey 
and Qatar receded into the background. 
The renewed fighting preserved its posi-
tion as an indispensable partner for Ahrar 
al-Sham and the FSA on the battlefield. The 
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rebels generally lack the pinpoint attack 
and storming capability of JN/JFS which 
specializes in the use of suicide bombers 
to break forward defences. During the 2015 
advances by the Army of Conquest, the suc-
cesses of those FSA units who were equipped 
with state-of-the-art anti-tank weapons 
showed there are alternatives to these tech-
niques if foreign backers are willing to 
supply non-Jihadi rebels with better equip-
ment. Yet the precarious situation in Aleppo 
drove FSA units to partner once again with 
JN/JFS even though they feared the group 
would try to exploit possible successes by 
expanding into Aleppo at their expense. 
According to UN envoy Staffan de Mistura, 
by late 2016 some 900 JN/JFS fighters out of 
a maximum of 8,000 rebels were besieged 
in Aleppo. In October 2016, de Mistura 
offered to escort them out of Aleppo but the 
group refused. As aerial bombing continued 
and in the absence of any guarantees for 
the rebel-held parts of Aleppo, many in the 
opposition supported this position despite 
Turkish pressure to the contrary. Instead, 
they joined an attempt by JN/JFS to relieve 
the pressure with a new attack on regime-
held West Aleppo, which also failed. Ankara 
had, in fact, joined the Russian demand 
for an exit of JN/JFS from the city by mid-
October to deprive Russia of an excuse to 
continue levelling the city. While Ankara 
continues to support the rebels by keeping 
supply lines through Turkey generally open, 
it considers Aleppo an essential part of its 
own cultural heritage and has become 
increasingly wary of drawing Russian ire. 
Moscow, in turn, resumed its indiscrimi-
nate bombing of Aleppo by mid-November 
without drawing any reaction from US 
president-elect Donald Trump who had 
spoken with Vladimir Putin just hours 
before. This allowed the Assad regime and 
its Shi’ite militia allies to capture large 
parts of the Eastern sector of the city. 
The Public Sphere of Jihad 
With events on the ground alternating 
between prospects of a truce and further 
deterioration, fissures between but also 
within rebel groups became more visible. 
Hard-line and more moderate factions vied 
for dominance over what may be called 
the public sphere of Jihad: virtual networks 
that maintain the often fickle loyalty of 
fighters within Syria and form the opinion 
of supporters abroad, including wealthy 
private donors for the cause, mostly in the 
Gulf States. 
Officially, many of the clerics weighing 
in to these debates do not belong to any 
specific group which allows them to lend 
credence and (Jihadi) legitimacy to some 
actions and positions rather than others 
and occasionally also to mediate between 
groups. Their relevance became apparent 
in October 2016 when fighting broke out 
between Ahrar al-Sham and Jund al-Aqsa, a 
Jihadist faction where JN/JFS had offloaded 
many of its foreign, more extremist opera-
tives. Reportedly, it also uses the group as 
enforcers to assassinate FSA officers and 
other figures seen as obstacles to its control 
over local communities. Jund al-Aqsa is also 
suspected of cooperating with the Islamic 
State, in particular arranging the transfer 
of recruits to the Islamic State from rebel 
areas such as Idlib through the Hama region 
to Islamic State territory in eastern Syria. 
Other rebel brigades quickly declared 
their backing for Ahrar al-Sham against 
Jund al-Aqsa. They included Jaish al-Islam, 
a Salafi group that has Saudi backing. Al-
though concentrated in the Eastern Ghouta 
near Damascus, Jaish al-Islam is also present 
in the central province of Homs. Despite 
differences and sometimes deadly confron-
tations with Ahrar al-Sham, Jaish al-Islam 
and the other brigades saw Jund al-Aqsa as 
a lethal fifth-column of the Islamic State 
that had to be destroyed while it remained 
a relatively small force. But the campaign 
against the group was condemned online 
by a number of clerics. Perhaps the most 
prominent of them, Abdallah al-Muhaysini 
from Saudi Arabia, proposed solving the 
dispute by having Jund al-Aqsa disband and 
its members join JFS. Wary of being blamed 
for causing rebel fratricide that Assad’s 
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forces could exploit, Ahrar al-Sham acqui-
esced and stopped the attacks. Thus, with 
little more than a few Twitter messages, 
these clerics had stopped several of the 
major rebel groups in their tracks. Muhay-
sini in particular has become a star to many 
Salafist Jihadis fighting in Syria on the 
strength of his oratory skills, his physical 
presence on the battlefield and his un-
abashed militancy. Some of Muhaysini’s 
propaganda footage aimed at recruiting 
fighters shows him making speeches stand-
ing on the bodies of dead regime soldiers. 
In another, Muhaysini bids goodbye to a 
suicide bomber before he sets off on a mis-
sion. He also addresses rebel child soldiers 
while they practice with assault rifles. 
Hailing from Saudi-Arabia and endowed 
with private funding from his home region 
of al-Qassim, Muhaysini, whose discourse 
doubles down on the al-Qaeda-inspired 
creed and the need for unity, has emerged 
as a regular arbiter between JFS and Ahrar 
al-Sham. 
Yet the Jihadi hegemony over Islamist 
public opinion does not go uncontested. 
Non-Jihadist clerics opposed to Assad have 
started to emulate Muhaysini’s use of social 
media and circulate videos that expose the 
theological fallacies of the Jihadis. But, as 
indicated by their Twitter followers and 
views on YouTube, their viewership is far 
smaller than that of Muhaysini. Among 
the most active on social media is Hassan 
al-Dughaim who hails from a prominent 
family in the town of Jarjanaz in Idlib prov-
ince. Dughaim escaped two assassination 
attempts in his hometown which he blamed 
on JFS. Dughaim often attacks JFS leader 
al-Golani on YouTube and Twitter for irrevo-
cably damaging the Syrian revolt and Islam. 
Dughaim lists activists and rebels killed by 
the groups and those held and tortured in 
its prisons as well as details of theft, looting 
and other transgressions. He points to spe-
cific religious prescriptions he says JFS rou-
tinely violates and exposes religious claims 
by its clerics and leaders as vacuous. Also on 
social media, many citizen journalists who 
had supported JN/JFS as an effective force 
against the Assad regime appear to have 
become disillusioned with the group. For 
example, the influential activist and citizen 
journalist Haitham Radoun switched to giv-
ing more space in his reports to non-al-Qaeda 
figures, such as Anas Ayrout. A Salafist cleric 
from Baniyas, Ayrout led protests against 
Assad in his home city in 2011 and evaded 
capture by the regime for months before 
fleeing to Turkey and becoming a member 
of the Etilaf. In 2013, Ayrout called for tar-
geting Alawite civilians in retaliation for 
the indiscriminate regime bombing of Sunni 
civilians and to drive Assad’s supporters to 
the negotiation table. Seeing the extra cred-
ibility that figures such as Muhaysini ob-
tained from their physical presence on the 
battlefield, Ayrout quit the Etilaf in 2016 
and joined Failaq al-Sham inside Syria as a 
shar’i (religious juror). Despite the strong 
rhetoric, Ayrout is seen as a less militant 
figure than Muhaysini and has participated 
in the revolt from day one. He is Syrian 
himself rather than a foreigner fighting on 
Syrian soil and has maintained links with 
the mainstream political opposition. 
The Ruralization of Rebels 
Muhaysini and other clerics have success-
fully targeted Sunni victims of displace-
ment as ripe recruits for their brand of 
al-Qaeda-inspired Jihad. Beaming on his 
Twitter account, Muhaysini was filmed in 
Idlib greeting fighters and civilians from 
the destroyed Damascus suburb of Daraya 
in September 2016. Around 3,000 people, 
two thirds of them civilians, were trans-
ferred in regime busses to Idlib under the 
evacuation terms offered by the regime. The 
fall of Daraya after years of resisting the 
regime’s siege increased Assad’s hold on 
the mostly Sunni suburbs, the Western part 
of which has now been either subdued or 
depopulated. Infighting has also weakened 
rebels holding on to territory to the East 
of the capital, one of the last main urban 
regions under their control. If Eastern 
Aleppo were to fall completely, the rebels 
would be increasingly squeezed into rural 
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regions. Endemic corruption, agricultural 
mismanagement and substandard educa-
tion, all of which had been amplified by the 
botched Assad “reform” process in the early 
2000s, have provided a fertile ground for 
extremists like JN/JFS in many of these areas 
which are controlled by the group’s perva-
sive intelligence apparatus. They are un-
likely to leave any space for the more civic-
minded elements among rebels evacuated 
from places like Daraya and will likely ab-
sorb many of those evacuated from urban 
areas into the Jihadi brigades. 
The group has been also recruiting a new 
generation of young fighters, many of whom 
were orphaned or displaced during the 
revolt and grew up with no education other 
than al-Qaeda-inspired teachings and with-
out forming attachments to local commu-
nities. On the other side, the countryside 
has also witnessed the emergence of a civic 
spirit among its youth long neglected by 
the center and frustrated by both Baathist 
and Islamist ideology. Some towns, such as 
Kfar Nubul in Idlib province, have shown 
resilience to the rise of JN/JFS and shrewd-
ness in dealing with the group. Hundreds 
of locally rooted rebel brigades loosely con-
sidered part of the FSA also exist in dor-
mant or active form in Idlib and elsewhere. 
It will not be easy for JN/JFS to swallow 
them and smother civil structures even if 
it were to resolve differences with Ahrar 
al-Sham which has often balanced JN/JFS’s 
dominance on the local level. Yet while 
local councils and other civic organiza-
tions, such as the White Helmets rescue or-
ganization, have fared better in rebel areas 
where JN/JFS is not dominant, the group 
appears to have realized it cannot manage 
services on its own. For example, the group 
has started to allow officials from the oppo-
sition’s interim government to come in 
and address local needs in the areas of Idlib 
province under its control. In other areas, 
local figures have been employed by aid 
agencies to act as interlocutors with JN/ 
JFS to allow aid shipments through. The 
flexibility of JN/JFS has, however, not trans-
lated into dialogue or political leverage 
over the group by the mainstream oppo-
sition. 
Recurring Patterns, 
Narrowing Options 
Events on the ground in recent months in-
dicate a clear pattern. Every time violence 
recedes and the silver lining of some sort 
of political process appears on the horizon, 
non-Jihadi rebels prepare for participation 
and popular discontent with the radicals 
comes to the fore. Once fighting resumes, 
moderate rebels and the population in 
opposition-held areas are faced with the 
same conundrum: as much as they loathe 
JN/JFS and fear their presence will attract 
aerial attacks not only from the regime but 
also from Russia and the US, crucial front 
lines will not hold without them. 
The Russian air campaign has also helped 
eliminate major foes of JN/JFS, facilitating 
the spread of the group. Russian forces ap-
pear to have primarily targeted FSA units 
and, to a lesser degree, Ahrar al-Sham. So 
far, the strategy pursued by the regime and 
Russia appears to be aimed mostly at de-
stroying any moderate alternative to extrem-
ists such as JN/JFS or the Islamic State. 
The influence of such groups could be 
greatly reduced if Syria’s Sunnis, who form 
the bulk of the dead and displaced in the 
civil war, are offered a serious alternative in 
the form of a political transition. If a Sunni 
peace dividend in the form of electoral 
empowerment and the return of refugees 
materializes, popular pressure would grow 
on JN/JFS to disband. Rebel commanders 
and opposition figures, as well as moderate 
clerics who have started to challenge JN/JFS 
on ideological grounds, would be boosted 
if they were to unite and offer an attractive 
alternative. This would also require that 
Saudi Arabia use its significant ideological 
influence to steer support towards more 
moderate actors in the “public sphere of 
Jihad”. Such a concerted effort may succeed 
in prying away at least part of the pragma-
tist faction of JN/JFS and establishing a last-
ing divide between radical Jihadis that have 
SWP Comments 52 
December 2016 
8 
to be fought and Islamist groups that are 
ready to participate in the political process. 
In organizations that straddle this divide, 
such as Ahrar al-Sham, pragmatists like Labib 
al-Nahhas will be on more solid ground. 
But the Assad regime, basking in Russian 
and Iranian support, has already dismissed 
the Geneva deal for a political transition 
as old hat. For his part, John Kerry, the US 
Secretary of State, has acknowledged the 
possibility of Assad running for another 
term under internationally supervised elec-
tions. For many Syrians who lived through 
decades of rigged elections, international 
supervision offers little comfort as long as 
Assad retains power and controls the ad-
ministration, in particular the process of 
generating the electoral rolls. Judging from 
his campaign statements, US president-
elect Donald Trump may go even further 
and seek to rehabilitate Assad. This would 
tie in well with the growing international 
preoccupation with “fighting terrorism” 
and the increasing sense that the Middle 
East cannot be fixed, but only contained. 
The implication would be that, given the 
magnitude of the challenge, such contain-
ment may require unsavoury means and 
ruthless characters ready to wield them – 
such as Bashar al-Assad. By this logic, a con-
tinuation of the current at best half-hearted 
support for the rebels will only increase the 
violence and fail to dislodge Assad, so better 
to focus on containing the spill over of 
refugees and help reconstruct the country 
even if that means turning a blind eye to 
the atrocities committed by the regime. 
Slipshod Solutions and Their Risk 
There is, however, no guarantee that a 
return to the pre-2011 status quo would 
help end the suffering and roll back Jihad-
ism. As Assad himself has said, his regime 
will seek to re-assert its authority over all 
areas still controlled by the rebels, such as 
Idlib, and parts of Hama and Deraa prov-
ince which are inhabited by hundreds of 
thousands of people who have now lived 
outside his grip for years. Such attempts 
will likely prompt the Jihadists to merge 
and/or change their tactics as they get 
squeezed into a narrower territory with 
little room left for the more moderate rebels. 
Similar to Iraq, Syria may end up having 
its own hard-to-conquer ‘Sunni Triangle’ in 
Idlib and other parts of the north that con-
tinue to spawn instability and recruits for 
the Jihadi cause. The trajectory of the Syrian 
civil war so far has shown that only a com-
bination of military pressure and Russian 
prodding could bring the regime to the 
negotiating table and offer at least some 
concessions. In the absence of Western 
willingness to shore up the rebel’s military 
strength and risk an open confrontation 
with Moscow, one option could be to help 
rebels hold on to what they already have 
through more potent weapons and/or a 
serious threat of intervention if the regime 
advances, freeing them from the need to 
depend on the Jihadis. This would require 
that the three main rebel backers – Turkey, 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia – take direct charge, 
stop working at cross-purposes, and stop 
elite members from implementing their 
own foreign policy. Most likely, this by 
itself would still not be sufficient to compel 
the regime to seek compromise. Yet one 
should not automatically assume that Rus-
sian support, on which Assad depends more 
than ever, is unconditional and open-ended. 
In the medium term, Moscow may be more 
interested in consolidating the strategic 
and political gains it has already achieved 
and become part of a solution than hold 
out for an elusive total victory. Therefore, a 
strategy to consolidate the non-Jihadi rebels 
should be accompanied by consistent signals 
to Moscow that the door to a diplomatic 
process remains open. 
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